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Abstract: During the administration of Felipe Calderón (2006–2012), the Armed Forces were used 
to combat organized crime in Mexico. Since then, the Mexican government has sought to change 
the military doctrine and legislation to include the concept of internal security in order to legalize 
the participation of the Army and Navy in public security. However, after the creation of the National 
Gendarmerie within the Federal Police during the administration of Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–2018), 
the Army decided to strengthen the Military Police as the body in charge of internal security opera-
tions. Path dependence on the use of Armed Forces for public security purposes is being maintained 
by the government of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador with the creation of the National Guard. 
This paper seeks to find the institutional and political causes that are behind the strengthening of the 
Armed Forces and the military doctrine shift towards public security in Mexico. Some of the questions 
to be answered are: Which are the organizational reasons behind these changes in the Mexican Army? 
Are there institutional incentives in the Mexican Armed Forces that are pushing for these changes? Is 
there a regional agenda, supported by the United States, which encourages these changes? Which are 
the medium- and long-term consequences of these changes for the Mexican Army?
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Las Fuerzas Armadas mexicanas en la Seguridad Pública: 
trayectorias dependientes y conflictos de poder
Resumen: Durante el gobierno de Felipe Calderón (2006–2012), las Fuerzas Armadas se utilizaron para 
combatir el crimen organizado en México. Desde entonces, el gobierno mexicano ha tratado de modificar 
la doctrina y la legislación militar para incluir el concepto de seguridad interna con el objetivo de legalizar la 
participación del Ejército y la Armada en la seguridad pública. No obstante, tras la creación de la Gendarmería 
Nacional dentro de la Policía Federal durante la administración de Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–2018), el Ejército 
decidió fortalecer a la Policía Militar como el organismo encargado de las operaciones de seguridad interna. 
El gobierno del presidente Andrés Manuel López Obrador mantiene las trayectorias dependientes del uso 
de las Fuerzas Armadas para fines de seguridad pública con la creación de la Guardia Nacional. Este trabajo 
busca encontrar las causas institucionales y políticas que están detrás del fortalecimiento de las Fuerzas 
Armadas y el cambio de doctrina militar hacia la seguridad pública en México. Algunos de los interrogantes 
por responder son: ¿cuáles son las razones organizacionales para estos cambios en el ejército mexicano? 
¿Existen incentivos institucionales en las Fuerzas Armadas mexicanas que presionan para que se hagan estos 
cambios? ¿Existe una agenda regional, con el respaldo de los Estados Unidos, que aliente estos cambios? 
¿Cuáles son las consecuencias a mediano y largo plazo de estos cambios para el ejército mexicano?
Palabras clave: Fuerzas Armadas mexicanas; militarización; seguridad Pública; teoría de las  
trayectorias dependientes.
As forças armadas mexicanas na segurança pública: trajetórias 
dependentes e conflitos de poder
Resumo: Durante o governo de Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), as Forças Armadas foram utilizadas para 
combater o crime organizado no México. Desde então, o governo mexicano tenta alterar a doutrina e a 
legislação militar para incluir o conceito de “segurança interna”, a fim de legalizar a participação do Exército 
e da Armada na segurança pública. Contudo, após a criação da Gendarmaria Nacional, dentro da Polícia 
Federal durante a administração de Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018), o Exército decidiu fortalecer a Polícia 
Militar como o organismo encarregado pelas operações de segurança interna. O governo do presidente 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador mantém as trajetórias que dependem do uso das Forças Armadas para 
fins de segurança pública com a criação da Guarda Nacional. Este trabalho pretende encontrar as causas 
institucionais e políticas que estão por trás do fortalecimento das Forças Armadas e da mudança da doutrina 
militar na segurança pública no México. A partir disso, são levantadas algumas questões: quais são as 
razões organizacionais para essas mudanças no exército mexicano? Há incentivos institucionais nas Forças 
Armadas mexicanas que pressionam para que essas mudanças sejam feitas? Há uma agenda regional, com 
o apoio dos Estados Unidos, que incentive essas mudanças? Quais são as consequências em médio e longo 
prazo dessas mudanças para o exército mexicano?
Palavras-chave: Forças Armadas mexicanas; militarização; segurança pública; teoria das trajetórias 
dependentes.
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Introduction
The origin or evolution of any security institution 
creates power conflicts inside governments world-
wide. Security organizations have strategic goals 
that produce interagency conflicts such as the 
achievement of political (access to strategic deci-
sion-making) or economic (the budget of security 
agencies that in the case of Mexico is about 10 bil-
lion usd) power. Other factors include the num-
ber of members of an institution and the struggle 
for technology, armament and equipment (Rodrí-
guez and Le Clercq, 2019). Nevertheless, the most 
important power, that which legitimizes, gives 
responsibility and as such, provides political, eco-
nomic and budget foundations, is the legal power.
Without a law or constitutional rule, securi-
ty institutions are in a legal interregnum to de-
mand for new resources to operate. Thus, former 
National Defense Secretary Salvador Cienfuegos 
(2012–2018), unsuccessfully promoted an Inter-
nal Security Act to consolidate the power of the 
Armed Forces in the security strategy. However, 
the current political and resource war that law en-
forcement agencies are experiencing is due to the 
creation of the National Guard.
Mexico’s political opposition (pan, pri, prd and 
mc) demonstrated political will to block constitu-
tional changes that required more votes than those 
obtained by the coalition supporting the president. 
Creating an intermediary military-oriented secu-
rity body by a Constitutional reform was a haz-
ardous political bet for the Mexican government. 
In legal and operational terms, it was far easier to 
increase the force of the Federal Police (pf, by its 
Spanish acronym) from the National Gendarmerie 
with the support of the Armed Forces. Neverthe-
less, López Obrador was backed by the opposition 
in reforming the constitution and, thus created the 
National Guard. The government is now allocat-
ing the Army and Navy budget to train and recruit 
new members for the National Guard. According 
to Security Secretary Alfonso Durazo, the ideal 
force of this new institution should be around 100 
and 150 thousand officers.
Lopez Obrador’s administration made a 
cost-benefit analysis in order to make this deci-
sion. This implied that the fastest, most efficient 
and least expensive route to create the Nation-
al Guard was to entrust this responsibility to the 
Armed Forces. The Mexican Armed Forces (Army 
and Navy) is an institution that, per se, has five 
clear advantages to achieve this goal: a) discipline 
and military doctrine; b) military facilities across 
the country to train and host this new intermedi-
ary institution; c) mobility for deployment at a na-
tional level; d) officers and commanders to lead the 
strategic zones; and e) a combined force of about 
45,000 military police and navy officers.
Mexican Armed Forces more frequently get in-
volved in activities that are within the jurisdiction 
of civilian authorities. There is a responsibility to 
create a national police service with a true state 
of force that allows quasi ever-present territorial 
deployment. In this sense, the Armed Forces and 
civilian institutions have to understand that the 
military-civil post-revolutionary pact (Serrano, 
1995) should be re-addressed in the framework of 
a new country, taking into account the complexity 
of the public agenda and politicization (i.e., the in-
crease of political actors with multiple stakes). On 
the other hand, from the governmental-civilian 
and social points of view, there is a movement that 
opposes the structural participation of the Armed 
Forces in the civilian arena. This reflects the grow-
ing disapproval of the Armed Forces in the public 
opinion and the continual criticism of this reality 
by national and international media.
Therefore, this paper seeks to answer the fol-
lowing questions: Which are the institutional 
reasons and policies behind these changes in the 
Mexican Army? Are there institutional incentives 
in the Mexican Armed Forces that promote these 
changes? Is there a regional agenda, supported 
by the United States, to promote these changes? 
Which are the medium —and long-term— chal-
lenges of these changes in the Mexican Army?
In order to answer them, this paper presents a 
comprehensive analysis of the framework that ex-
plains the evolution of military institutions in the 
security area as a path dependence phenomenon 
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(Mahoney, 2001 & Pierson, 2000, 2004) that is not 
exempt from the power-seeking fight within the 
country (Rodríguez, 2017) and which responds 
to the theory of evolution of security institutions 
(Zegart, 1999).
Discussion
I. Institutional incentives, struggle 
for power and evolution of security 
institutions in Mexico
The Mexican Armed Forces’ participation in in-
ternal security activities is not new; nonetheless, 
they have been continuously used in public secu-
rity matters since the administration of former 
President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012). The de-
ployment pattern of the Army and Navy in these 
activities continued and deepened during Enrique 
Peña Nieto’s administration (2012–2018) with the 
approval of the Internal Security Act, which final-
ized with a greater constitutional reform in the 
early days of the administration of current Presi-
dent Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018–).
This is a reminder that once a country has be-
gun an institutional path, reverse-related costs are 
high. As Margaret Levi (1997) argued, there might 
be other choosing points, but the arrangements 
of certain institutional accords might obstruct an 
easy change of the initial choice (as cited in Pier-
son, 2000, p. 28)1.
1  Pierson (2004) affirms that time and sequence matter be-
cause the process of self-reinforcement that has implica-
tions for a particular subject in the political and social 
spheres might transform the consequences of later stag-
es in a sequence. Given this a historic sequence point of 
view allows for analyzing the arguments about how path 
dependency faces the claims about political change as 
well as political inertias.
Figure 1. Path dependence on the Armed Forces used 
for public security issues.
Source: Aguilar Romero (2019).
In this sense, path dependence processes can op-
erate to institutionalize political arrangements that 
turn out to be particularly vulnerable to any event 
or process that comes in a later stage of the politi-
cal development (Pierson, 2004). This translates in 
how path dependence works to shield decisions and 
arrangements, even when there are governmental 
changes or potential future political party transitions 
that are usual in the Mexican political scene.
This is especially important within the Mexi-
can national context taking into consideration that 
changes of government affect previously estab-
lished objectives, the design and implementation 
of policies, as well as the continuity of formula-
tions and decisions. In this sense, it is essential to 
identify the main objective of each administration 
to point out motives for decisions and vulnerabili-
ties throughout the period studied. Thus, political 
change or stability must be considered as an im-
portant factor to shield the research of these types 
of narratives, losing the institutional approach.
Figure 2 shows the analytical structure of an ar-
gument with a path dependence approach extrap-
olated to the political arena in order to understand 
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the institutional results but, most importantly, 
how processes are implemented. According to 
Pierson (2004), there are four interconnected po-
litical issues, meaning that each one of these char-
acteristics make political and institutional inertias 
prevail.
Figure 2. Analytical structure of an explanation from a 
path dependence approach.
Source: Mahoney (2001).
Firstly, the main role of collective action is estab-
lished. In politics, the consequences of the actions of 
an actor highly depend on other people’s actions. An 
important factor is the absence of a linear relation 
between effort and effect. In those circumstances in 
which making a decision would generate high costs, 
actors must constantly adjust their behavior to the 
potential actions of other actors. If there is a deci-
sion to create a new political party, join a coalition 
or provide resources to a stakeholder, it will depend 
on the probability that other actors make the same 
decision (Pierson, 2004).
The second characteristic refers to the high 
density of institutions. Institutions and policies 
to invest in specialization deepen relations with 
other actors, whereas developing particular social 
and political identities motivate both individuals 
and organizations. This causes greater attraction 
towards current institutional accords with regard 
to other hypothetic alternatives.
Actually, in institutionally dense environ-
ments, the main actions set the individual behav-
ior towards difficult reverse paths (social actors 
make decisions and commitments based on cur-
rent institutions and policies). Given this, there are 
two possible sources of path dependence in poli-
tics: power dynamics and social understanding 
patterns (Pierson, 2004).
The third characteristic is set in terms of power 
as the possibility of using political authority to en-
hance power asymmetries. Actors can use such au-
thority to change the rules of the game —through 
institutions and different policies— in order to 
strengthen their power. This not only produces a 
change of rules on their favor but also increases 
their own capacities to act politically and, at the 
same time, decreases their rival’s capacities. These 
changes also result in adaptations that reinforce 
these tendencies towards uncertain, poorly en-
gaged or vulnerable actors joining the winners or 
leaving the losers —change of party or interests in 
their parliamentary group— (Pierson, 2004).
Accordingly, Pierson concludes that minor 
events that happen at the right moment can have 
greater and ever-lasting consequences, but the 
timing of these events is crucial because early 
events in a sequence are more important than the 
subsequent ones. In fact, an event that occurs ‘too 
late’ might not have effects, even when it shows 
that it might have had big consequences if the tim-
ing had been different. Finally, the key point with-
in path dependence is inertia, because once the 
process is established, positive feedback —mean-
ing measures or policies at different levels driven 
towards the same objective— moves towards the 
same equilibrium and probably this is going to be 
change-averse to subsequent events.
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Pattern dependence on the Armed  
Forces for public security operations
Mexico’s military body has been directed (from its 
origins) towards the confrontation of internal threats 
and problems. Combined with the decomposition of 
public security and justice bodies, this has generated 
an expansion of the Armed Forces, which has notice-
ably increased since the 2000’s (Moloeznik, 2008). 
Nevertheless, civilian authorities’ low development 
levels and lack of capacity depends greatly on the 
preferential support of military authorities.
In addition, the paradigm that favors the conti-
nuity of the Armed Forces is the one generated be-
tween national security, within their jurisdiction, 
and public security, within the civilian authority, 
particularly considering that inter-governmental 
strategies at different levels of government have 
been a failure as they ignore structural variables. 
The complexity of national security agencies which 
deal with a lack of compatibility facing the pub-
lic security agencies stands out as the main issue. 
There are other situations such as budget allocat-
ed, social and economic perspective of each type 
of agency (Rodríguez, 2017).
The Armed Forces are designed and appointed 
to safeguard national security, that is, against sce-
narios in which “any of the main elements of the 
state such as the incumbent government, institu-
tions, population, as well as national sovereignty 
and territorial integrity” are threatened (Rodrí-
guez, 2017, p. 19). However, military corporations 
are progressively involved in activities pertaining 
to civilian authorities. This is presented in the 
first attributions changes, meaning that they have 
changed from the defense of sovereignty and na-
tional defense to tasks such as:
destruction of drug growing areas, public safety ac-
tions, cleaning and reconstructing areas affected by 
natural disasters, reforestation in certain regions, re-
ducing illiteracy, battling guerillas, direct fight against 
organized crime, reconstructing police institutions at 
federal, state and municipal levels, disaster zone pro-
tection, human remains recovery missions, safeguard-
ing strategic facilities, security during electoral periods, 
public health crusades and attention to pandemics, 
among other problems  (Rodríguez, 2017, p. 134).
Power maximization conflict
The conflict between organizations to achieve the 
maximization of power can be explained by great-
er political attention from the president in order to 
promote personal and institutional agendas, and 
the presence of a struggle to reach bigger budgets 
in order to have more institutional capabilities, 
therefore causing conflicts for legal power (Rodrí-
guez, 2017).
One of the best examples of a power maximiza-
tion conflict can be seen in a diplomatic cable from 
the United States Embassy in Mexico (2010) that 
points out how “Mexican security institutions of-
ten are seen as a sum-zero competition in which 
the success of an agency is seen as the failure of 
another; the information is carefully kept and the 
joint operations are almost unknown”.
High-level political attention (political capital). 
Clearly, the conflict to get the attention of the pres-
ident or political leader damages the intergovern-
mental coordination of cabinets. The secretary that 
best fulfills the president’s instructions has a better 
chance to convey his necessities in order to accom-
plish their missions. This can be seen reflected in 
the allocation of higher economic resources when 
compared with other security institutions.
Fighting for budget (economic power). “Budget al-
location” was identified as one of the main causes of 
structural conflict between national security organi-
zations that has a direct effect on their coordination. 
The fight for budget cannot be left out of the political 
conflict between sedena and cns in 2013 and 2014 
over the affiliation of the Gendarmerie to any of 
these institutions. Capacity-building, even if it is just 
for some two thousand new officers of the federal ci-
vilian or military law enforcement agencies, requires 
a significant amount of extraordinary public financ-
ing, doctrine instruction and operational training 
of new cadres. Additional funding resources in any 
institution help to legally finance technical and ad-
ministrative areas, as well as to build or remodel fa-
cilities. The mandate to equip new members creates 
new opportunity areas for financing other institu-
tional capacities that can be shared with the rest of 
the organization or assigned internally, for example, 
when there are armament and equipment industries.
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Theory of the origin and evolution  
of national security agencies
The theory of the origin and evolution of nation-
al security agencies as proposed by Zegart (1999, 
p. 336) is highly useful to understand power dy-
namics among the actors involved, such as the 
government, congress, political parties and other 
social actors. Zegart points out that the Executive 
prevails in decision-making regarding institution-
al changes over the rest of the actors that want to 
participate in the construction and evolution of 
a country’s national security agencies. Zegart’s 
propositions that explain the original process of 
construction and evolution of national security 
agencies are the following:
Proposition 1: The executive branch drives the 
creation of national security agencies. Congress 
plays, at best, only a secondary role.
Proposition 2: In national security affairs, ex-
isting bureaucratic actors have much to gain or 
lose with the creation of a new agency and will 
fight to preserve their own institutional interests.
Proposition 3: The evolution of national securi-
ty agencies, like their creation, is driven by forces 
within the executive branch –by the president, by 
the agency itself, and by its supporters and oppo-
nents in other bureaucratic offices.
Proposition 4: National security agencies de-
velop with sporadic, largely ineffectual oversight 
by the Congress. Members have neither the incen-
tives nor the capabilities to keep constant watch 
over agency activities.
ii. Background of the use of the 
Armed Forces in public security 
matters
Participation of the Armed Forces in public securi-
ty has been intricately linked to different strategies 
against drug trafficking. This phenomenon is rele-
vant for two reasons, first, because it has been the 
factor that has determined the different national 
or public security strategies, and second, because 
the fight against drug trafficking should not be a 
matter of national security but public safety. Ac-
cording to Rosas, Dammert, Magaloni, Ungar, and 
Secretaría de Seguridad Pública (2012), a partial 
preventive model, the right intelligence system 
and a justice system could face this threat directly 
and robustly. The previous analysis is essential to 
this research because it allows to identify the ini-
tial moments and the strengthening of the conver-
gence between military and civilian institutions.
Therefore, it is necessary to start with the mo-
ment in which the Armed Forces began to fight 
drug trafficking. The Mexican Army has partici-
pated in anti-drug missions since 1938, when for-
mer President Lázaro Cárdenas attempted to put 
narcotics production under State control. None-
theless, Luis Astorga mentions that it officially be-
gan in 1947 with the “participation of the Armed 
Forces in the fight against drugs and the creation 
of the Security Federal Direction (dfs, by its Span-
ish  acronym) with personnel enrolled in the 
Army” and the support of units such as the 10th 
Infantry Battalion or the 18th Cavalry and aircraft 
Regiment to locate plantations (as cited in García 
Luna, 2018, p. 25). After this, in 1948, the ‘Great 
campaign’ began, which entailed the manual de-
struction of illicit crops (García Luna, 2018).
The ‘Canador Plan’ started in 1996, which 
stands out because it was the first massive deploy-
ment of military troops for the task of eliminating 
plantations, with approximately 1,500 to 3,000 offi-
cers. In 1970, the Army and Air Force implemented 
strategies with the inhabitants of mountain areas to 
persuade them of dropping poppy and marihuana 
growing and harvesting, in addition to urging them 
to identify or break up drug trafficking organiza-
tions (Mendoza, 2016). When president Luis Eche-
verría took office, anti-narcotics police groups were 
created with the objective of stopping the market 
that would potentially surpass governmental con-
trol (Toro, M. in Aguayo, S. in Mendoza, 2016).
Further on, the Condor Operation was imple-
mented in 1977 and focused on drawing the atten-
tion to the ‘Golden Triangle,’ comprising Sinaloa, 
Chihuahua and Durango, especially the mountain 
area. Nevertheless, according to the cia (Central 
Intelligence Agency) report, the mission had dif-
ficulties such as land access, aerial support, lim-
ited intelligence and communications capabilities. 
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In this sense, it was specified that the missions also 
sought to eliminate plantations, control of illegal 
trails and shutting down illegal laboratories (as cit-
ed in Mendoza, 2016).
In 1986, during Miguel de la Madrid’s pres-
idential term, the special forces unit was created 
in the Army, called the Special Forces Aeromobile 
Group (gafe, by its Spanish acronym). The next 
year, the Mars Assignment Force began, which 
was the Condor Operation renamed (García Luna, 
2018). That same year, the Armed Forces were inte-
grated to the brand-new National Civil Protection 
System —created in response to the earthquakes 
occurred in September 19th, 1985, to face potential 
emergencies and natural disasters—, a situation 
that has allowed for projecting a positive and reli-
able image to society (Moloeznik, 2008).
In this context, drug trafficking was typified as a 
national security threat in 1970; nonetheless, it was 
not until 1987 when Mexican president Miguel de 
la Madrid declared drug trafficking as a national 
security problem, and its control as a state matter 
(Mendoza, 2016). This statement is a critical situa-
tion, considering that both drug trafficking and or-
ganized crime permeated —and it has remained so 
to this date— security institutions at all levels. In 
practice, these phenomena are related to public se-
curity, which eases the convergence of attributions 
both for the military and for police corporations. 
As Barrón (2004) expounds, the nature of drug traf-
ficking poses the convergence of situations such as 
sovereignty, national security and corruption, but 
mainly, the subordination of the Armed Forces to 
civilian authorities, which leads to turn its organi-
zations into hybrid police/military institutions.
In the 1990s the creation of the Control and 
Detection System through Mexican radars for 
detecting aircrafts that smuggled drugs into the 
country took place. In this period, there were sev-
eral updates to the basic structure of the Navy, 
such as the release of their internal regulation in 
which drug-trafficking fight was the most import-
ant responsibility. Furthermore, one of the highest 
national violence levels was reported, especially to-
wards the end of Carlos Salinas de Gortari’s presi-
dential term (Escalante, 2009).
In this period, there was another critical junc-
ture of the Armed Forces. The process of enlarge-
ment of their attributions continued because of the 
resolution of the Supreme Court (scjn, by its Span-
ish acronym) that established that the three forces 
could “participate in civilian actions in favor of 
public security aiding civilian authorities” (as cit-
ed in Moloeznik, 2008). In other words, it is not 
limited exclusively to drug-trafficking fight, but 
recognizes the support to the population in disas-
ters or weather contingencies —(the dn-iii-E plan 
and the sm-am-9O plan)—, reforestation and re-
vitalization of ecosystems, and even vaccination 
tasks and cholera prevention within the Solidarity 
Program framework (Juárez, 2016).
On the other hand, Armed Forces were de-
ployed with the emergence of the National Libera-
tion Zapatist Army (ezln, by its Spanish acronym). 
According to the official version, this meant the 
retreat of the armed body to the jungle, enclosing 
and containing the threat, under the argument of 
the constitutional attribution that established as a 
“requirement of the government, to keep and safe-
guard the country’s internal and public peace” (Sa-
linas as cited in Juárez, 2016, p. 233).
Ernesto Zedillo’s presidential term was charac-
terized by important events. First, the amendment to 
Article 21 of the Mexican Constitution on December 
31st, 1995, stands out. This meant the first reference 
to the concept of public security in a document with 
federal jurisdiction in the following paragraphs:
…Public security is a task entrusted to the Federa-
tion, the Federal District, states and municipalities, 
in the respective competences established in the 
Constitution. The actions of the police will be ruled 
by the principles of legality, efficiency, professional-
ism and integrity.
The Federation, Federal District, states and munici-
palities will be coordinated in the terms pointed out 
in the law to establish a national public security sys-
tem.  (as cited in Regino, 2007)
However, this adaptation did not translate into 
a better development of the concept and much 
less into its recognition as a fundamental right for 
Mexican citizens. In consequence, the General Act 
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that established the coordination bases of the Na-
tional Public Security System was passed in 1995. 
This new law stated a new approach to public se-
curity, maintaining the joint responsibility of the 
Federation, Federal District, States and Municipal-
ities for public security. Thus, the attribution is of a 
state nature and it focuses on the prevention, pros-
ecution of offences and crimes, imposition of ad-
ministrative sanctions, reintegration of criminals 
and minor perpetrators, and all those that “con-
tribute to achieving higher goals and safeguarding 
people’s integrity and rights, as well as preserving 
liberties, order and public peace” (Ulloa, 2000).
Establishing and setting the concept of pub-
lic security became more complex when this was 
identified in the projection of the sectoral pro-
gram, announcing elements that usually favor its 
own militarization. In 1995, as part of his first 
government report, the President announced the 
initiative of the Federal Organized Crime Act. 
When announcing their arguments, president Er-
nesto Zedillo stated that drug trafficking was the 
biggest threat to national security and revealed an 
increase in crime rates of organized groups which 
jeopardize, as a whole, the coexistence, values and 
traditions of the Mexican people.
In spite of the aforementioned analysis, in 1999 
the Senate approved an initiative to create a Preven-
tive Federal Police (pfp, by its  Spanish  acronym), 
comprising 4,800 officers, whose objective was to 
organize and watch over the operation of the pf. 
By the time, Ernesto Zedillo’s speech had evolved 
into one that recognized the necessity of putting 
law enforcement first because “public security and 
justice represent a main duty of the state” (as cited 
in Juárez, 2016, p. 239) and that all previously strat-
egies implemented had failed, concluding with the 
statement that all measures would be taken to avoid 
further failure. It is important to mention that this 
new institution also proposed the grouping of all 
the federal corporations, something that did not 
happened (Regino, 2007).
The transition to democracy in 2000 represent-
ed a breaking point in the civil-military relation, 
because so far in history, both Mexico and military 
institutions had matured in a political scenario 
dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary Par-
ty (pri, by its  Spanish  acronym). As Moloeznik 
(2008) establishes, “a party other than pri taking 
office, after the victory of Vicente Fox, brought out 
the institutionalism of the Mexican Armed Forces. 
Political alternation surpassed the litmus test.” For 
the first time, the Executive and as such, the com-
mander-in-chief, represented a new vision that 
sought out immediate legitimacy from military 
corporations on a national level.
In his inaugural address, Vicente Fox recog-
nized a strong linkage between military institu-
tions and public security when he mentioned that:
their loyalty to the Republic [of the Armed Forces], 
their strict compliance with their constitutional 
duties, their exemplary role in the drug-trafficking 
fight and civil protection and respect to the political 
processes of the country have become a key guaran-
tee of democracy  (Fox, 2000).
Moreover, he stated that a “new political future, 
after 71 years” was coming, and recognized the 
existence of “inertias and atavisms.” This speech 
allowed him to position a state reform through 
which he sought to demolish insecurity and topple 
impunity (Fox, 2000). As such, in security matters 
there were important modifications as well as the 
creation of new bodies.
In 2001, the Public Security Secretariat (ssp, 
by its Spanish acronym) was created alongside the 
reform of the Attorney General’s Office (pgr, by 
its  Spanish  acronym), both proposals previously 
made by his predecessor Ernesto Zedillo. The ssp, 
with its new legal framework, had the main objec-
tive of fighting organized crime through the co-
ordination and unification of state and municipal 
governmental efforts. Nonetheless, when combat-
ing organized crime, the work of four institutions, 
the ssp, the pgr, the Navy and National Defense 
Secretaries (Juárez, 2016), was clearly recognized.
From that point on, sedena established that 
“the main objective of Mexican militaries is to 
combat drug-trafficking and public insecurity,” 
(as cited in Moloeznik, 2008, p. 161). With the 
previous information, it is easy to identify that 
this statement depended strongly on the Supreme 
Court ruling of 1996 about the power of the Armed 
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Forces to participate in civilian activities in favor 
of public security.
That year, the Federal Investigation Agency 
(afi, by its  Spanish  acronym) was created as the 
operational arm within the administrative struc-
ture of the pgr. Nonetheless, it points out that it 
was enriched with former militaries and that the 
personnel received training in a semi-militarized 
environment (pgr, 2012). During 2002, the then 
National Defense Secretary, General Gerardo Cle-
mente Ricardo Vega García, recognized that “the 
Army, in its behavior and actions, is indisputably 
subject by law to civilian authority” (Vega-García, 
2003). This represented an imminent declaration 
of loyalty towards President Fox.
In this way, history confirms the construction 
of path dependence of the Mexican Armed Forces 
in public security matters. The central events that 
preceded the declaration of war on drugs by Fe-
lipe Calderón are: the declaration that classified 
the drug-trafficking fight as a national security 
matter; the resolution of the scjn that authorized 
the Armed Forces to participate in public security 
issues to support civilian authorities; and the cre-
ation of the pfp with 4,800 military members.
Felipe Calderón: War on drugs
Genaro García Luna (2018), Public Security Secre-
tary during the administration of Felipe Calderón, 
stated that in the last 40 years there was structural 
and investment abandonment of police institu-
tions at the municipal and state levels in Mexico.
Therefore, corruption took place when using 
the economic resources that originated from crime 
activities carried out by the police itself —such as 
bribery and handouts— to finance operational 
costs that were not satisfied. García Luna (2018) 
explains that in this scenario, he put forward the 
proposal of using military personnel. After this 
decision, the strategy was to block the institution-
al development of police officers, but also wearing 
the Armed Forces down in its new activities as a 
supporter of the civilian authority. This represents 
the construction and first step towards path de-
pendence, making it a critical juncture.
In the 2007–2012 National Development Plan 
(pnd, by its Spanish acronym) there were two cen-
tral points for our analysis: organized crime and law 
enforcement institutions. About organized crime, 
it was recognized that these groups represented a 
strong threat to national security and the resources 
derived from illicit activities facilitate the conditions 
to overcome the capacities of police bodies in charge 
of fighting and prevention of organized crime. So, 
the necessity of collaboration with the Armed Forc-
es is reaffirmed (Gobierno Federal, 2008).
Due to state weakness, one of the objectives, spe-
cifically number 8, was to regain the State strength 
and security in social coexistence through the di-
rect and successful confrontation of drug-traffick-
ing and other expressions of organized crime. This 
was composed of four strategies; nonetheless, only 
the first is relevant to this research, given that it 
represents the proposition that the Armed Forces 
will first be in charge of safekeeping the country’s 
internal security and second, responsible for fight-
ing organized crime (Gobierno Federal, 2008). 
This became the first official declaration from a 
governmental entity that specifically granted au-
thority to military corporations, beyond their re-
sponsibility for security at domestic levels.
In office, the president announced the National 
Campaign against crime that —through his power 
to deploy the entire Army— would send the Armed 
Forces to the streets with police-like attributions. 
Even, 10,000 soldiers joined the Federal Support 
Forces, an institution that was the strong arm of the 
then pfp (Regino, 2007). In the first quarter, there 
where resounding results: organized crime-related 
executions had doubled the previous year numbers. 
Initially, force deployment had been focused on the 
most vulnerable states, where there was an aston-
ishing increase in violence (Regino, 2007).
President Felipe Calderón faced a difficult po-
litical scenario and used the security problem as a 
way to increase his government approval ratings. In 
the same way, discussion on the subject strength-
ened the international scenario and became an im-
portant point in the relation with the United States 
within multiple binational agreements. Finally, the 
president faced power games among political parties 
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that, until that date, had blocked the creation of a 
state security policy (Astorga, 2015).
Eventually, Calderón posed his intention of 
improving police institutions through profession-
alization and through the eradication of internal 
corruption. However, the violence levels reached 
the year after taking office obscured his vision 
and led the decision-making process to the path 
of militarization that had been underway. The in-
crease in attribution was gradual but constant. In 
political terms, powerful actors favored the Armed 
Forces. Nonetheless, towards the mid-term, results 
were not as expected and the international public 
opinion towards the military strategy was critical 
due to poor local police conditions and corruption 
(Juárez, 2016).
Based on the previous reconstruction, Presi-
dent Felipe Calderón issued in early 2009 the Gen-
eral National Public Security System Act (lgsnsp). 
This act, according to Article 21 of the Constitu-
tion, clearly defined the objective of “establishing 
the distribution of tasks and the foundations of 
coordination among Federations, states, Federal 
District and municipalities in this regard” (Article 
1 of the lgsnsp) and, most importantly, with the 
purpose of evaluating and certifying the country’s 
police bodies. This act stands out for defining that 
all the police corporations have to be civilian, dis-
ciplined and professional. It also recognized the 
importance of the promotion of citizen’s participa-
tion and accountability of the public security insti-
tutions. Notwithstanding, results showed that the 
strengthening of the police at the federal, state and 
municipal levels was not adequate and this blocked 
the gradual roll-back of the Armed Forces.
Between 2009 and 2010 and because of the 
strong deployment, the Armed Forces were ques-
tioned over human rights matters and military 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, there was military 
personnel integrated to the federal and local pub-
lic administrations. For example, the National 
Defense Secretariat proposed to the Governor of 
Chihuahua the appointment of a retired Division 
General, Julián David Rivera Bretón, as Public Se-
curity Secretary and of Colonel, Alfonso Cristóbal 
García Melgar, as Police Municipal Director of Ci-
udad Juárez (Moloeznik, 2012).
In response to criticism by both national and 
international non-governmental organizations, 
Felipe Calderón justified the action taken by say-
ing: “Only by having truly professional police of-
ficers, we can make sure that the Armed Forces 
are relieved from their temporary and subsidiary 
positions of undergoing citizen’s security, without 
posing a danger to society” (Juárez 2016: 258).
Enrique Peña Nieto: National 
Gendarmerie, Military Police and the 
Internal Security Act
Path dependence theory shows that the route 
traced by Felipe Calderón’s presidential term did 
not generate institutional blockades except when 
there was a moment of structural persistence. The 
administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto 
represents that phase of structural persistence. Al-
though campaign discourse raised the reorienta-
tion of the public security strategy, governmental 
actions demonstrated the existence of continuity 
in the strategy. It is in these dynamics that the 
relevance of the approach stands out since these 
policies were, rather, the result of an existing path, 
backed not only by the discourse but also by the 
institutions, their structures and approaches.
At the beginning of his term Peña Nieto pro-
posed the creation of a National Gendarmerie, 
which would be an organization different from the 
pf and which would consist of 40,000 military mem-
bers under civilian rule (Hope, 2017). The Armed 
Forces showed resistance to this proposal but, al-
legedly for budgetary restrictions, the Gendarmerie 
was created in 2013 with only five thousand mem-
bers under military and police instruction (Hope, 
2013). In the end, the pf was maintained, the Armed 
Forces continued in public security operations, and 
the Gendarmerie became a small organization.
This new body became a division of the pf, op-
posite to what it was originally proposed to be: an 
intermediary body of military origin and identi-
ty. This plan sought to take advantage of the good 
image of the Armed Forces in order to build trust 
with society. It is important to highlight that even 
though this idea was altogether eliminated, upon 
defining the Gendarmerie as the seventh division 
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of the pf, its training was military nonetheless 
(Hope, 2013). In the same way, the existence of this 
new security institution, in the words of the head 
of the Interior Secretariat (segob), Miguel Ángel 
Osorio Chong, would enable both the Army and 
Navy to retreat to the barracks.
Notwithstanding, it was clear that in this set-
ting the use of the Armed Forces in tasks assigned 
to civilian authority presented serious threats such 
as the persistence of high levels of violence. Be-
cause of this, the same military organizations de-
manded regulation and legal certainty regarding 
the lack of definition of concepts such as public se-
curity. As Moloeznik (2012) points out, ever since 
Felipe Calderon’s term, the Armed Forces started 
the search for an “ad hoc legal instrument that al-
lows them to withdraw from any type of complaint 
or legal process” (p. 139).
This concern, addressed by the pnd as a chal-
lenge to the Armed Forces, required an immedi-
ate response. It identified the necessity of having 
a better legal framework —specifically in internal 
security matters— that could provide them with 
certainty in its acting as a military organization, 
as well as for respecting human rights (Gobierno 
de la República, 2013).
In the pnd there was a first approach to the 
concept of internal security as an element on its 
own. Particularly, it was agreed that, as the Consti-
tution points out, the mission and purpose of the 
Armed Forces would be “defending the nation and 
contributing to its internal security” (Gobierno de 
la República, 2013, p. 32).
Nevertheless, multiple criticism and gaps iden-
tified in the initiatives led to the passing of the In-
ternal Security Act, published on November 30th, 
2017. This document, from which several contro-
versies arose, maintained the established defini-
tions and stated that internal security “responds 
to keep internal stability, peace and public order, 
and is a responsibility of the three government 
branches” (Cámara de Diputados, 2017, p. 50). This 
seemingly justified the participation of the Armed 
Forces and made legislators assessed their involve-
ment, as necessary. Once the Act was approved by 
the Chamber of Deputies, the opposition parties 
condemned it strongly having identified multiple 
risks and vulnerabilities that were not answered, 
despite it being only one bill.
It is important to note that the Act would have 
institutionalized the Armed Forces’ participation in 
several areas. That would have forcefully blocked all 
development plans in slate for police officers, in ar-
eas such as economic resources, training, and pro-
fessionalization. Nevertheless, the greatest threat 
was that it would have replaced the police force in 
its function, thus creating a new panorama in which 
civilian authority would have been useless.
There were movements, groups and organi-
zations that impetuously contributed to the dec-
laration of unconstitutionality by the scjn. The 
participation of the opposition in the Chamber of 
Deputies, with 115 votes signed against the bill, also 
stands out. Nonetheless, these actions could also 
have been in response to the political parties’ nar-
ratives under political junctures. This is where the 
next phase of the path dependence process, called 
reactive sequence, begins. In this phase, actors re-
spond to prevailing agreements through a series 
of predictable answers and counter-answers. This 
stage is specifically important because it takes the 
process directly to its final result (Mahoney, 2001).
The failure of the Internal Security Act sparked 
off the debate on the necessity of a framework that 
endorsed the Army day by day. However, from this 
particular point onwards it is necessary to high-
light that even though it is not possible to have 
military personnel without a legal framework, cre-
ating a law that allows them to be on the streets 
without the necessary adjustments, favors directly 
the continuity of path dependence.
During Peña Nieto’s government, there was 
a rise in the political power of the Armed Forces 
through the long reach of public debates and pub-
lic opinion. There was also the absorption of new 
bodies comprised of civilians that contributed to 
their public security tasks. On the other hand, the 
declaration of unconstitutionality of the Internal 
Security Act made clear that it was not a measure 
that catered correctly to the needs and consider-
ations of the state’s own survival. Even if it was 
victorious as a statement in favor of strengthening 
public security in Mexico, it was enough to keep 
alive the tenure in this route.
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Andrés Manuel López Obrador:  
National Guard
Upon being elected president, Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador (amlo) presented his Peace and 
Security National Plan. This document presented 
an ambitious plan that ranged from the elimina-
tion of corruption and the ethic regeneration of 
society to the reformulation of the fight against 
drug trafficking and the public security arena. In 
relation to the country’s militarization, it began by 
revealing that in Mexico more than 200,000 peo-
ple had been the murdered and more than 37,000 
had disappeared as a result of a “police and war-
mongering strategy” (López-Obrador, 2018, p. 10).
In the face of this scenario, the most important 
driving force was the public security plan, which 
was divided into three proposals, of which the first 
two are analyzed herein. Proposal number one re-
volved around rethinking national security and 
redirecting the Armed Forces, which had been 
worn down because of their fulfillment of tasks 
that were not within their jurisdiction. It also men-
tioned that the people’s trust had decreased, a par-
ticular situation considering that in the previous 
administration this was a key element to maintain 
the status quo (López-Obrador, 2018).
That same document recognized that mili-
tary forces did not have the sufficient training to 
prevent and investigate crimes, which seemingly 
explains why human rights violations have taken 
place. Likewise, it accepts that the military deploy-
ment has disabled the civilian public forces in the 
tasks of crime prevention and fighting since 2006, 
and also acknowledges that forty thousand ele-
ments from the pf were poorly trained and mostly 
fulfilled administrative tasks.
Despite this alarming diagnosis, it declared 
that it would be “disastrous to relieve the Armed 
Forces from their current activities in the public 
security area” (López-Obrador, 2018, p. 14). For 
this reason, there would be continuity in this pro-
vision taking into account Article 89 of the Consti-
tution, favoring respect for human rights, as well 
as personal integrity and property. It is important 
to point out that as portrayed in amlo’s Nation 
Project, the Armed Forces would disappear from 
the streets in the medium-term to make way for 
the National Guard, which would assume civil 
protection functions at a federal level on all issues 
(López-Obrador, 2018).
The second proposal was the formal establish-
ment of the National Guard. In order to achieve 
this, it was necessary to amend Article 76 (xv) of 
the Constitution so that this body could be an es-
sential tool of the Executive branch for preventing 
crime, safeguarding public security and fighting 
crime in the country. The document proposed the 
participation of military and navy police officers, 
the former pf in addition to the recruitment of 
civilians, specifically around 50,000 new guards 
(López-Obrador, 2018).
It is important to remember that President 
López Obrador’s administration is characterized 
by the victory of the National Regeneration Move-
ment (morena, by its  Spanish  acronym) in the 
Executive power. Furthermore, it has the majority 
in the Federal Congress with 259 deputies and 59 
senators, and the majority in 20 local congresses. 
This configuration shows the overwhelming power 
that morena and the president have at a national 
level. Nonetheless, this situation has also brought 
uncertainty on how this power would be used in 
the Mexican political scenario.
This represents the continuity of the status quo, 
where the Armed Forces continue to be deployed 
on the streets, but now with a constitutional sup-
port; that is, an institutionalization of this measure 
has taken place at a national level. Furthermore, 
in the transitory articles of the act concerning the 
creation of the National Guard, it is stated that in 
the next five years, both sedena and semar are go-
ing to be involved in the hierarchic structure and 
discipline regime They will have control over the 
income admission tools, education, training, pro-
fessionalization, promotions and benefits of the 
Armed Forces (dof, 2019).
iii. The National Guard: Upcoming 
conflicts and future challenges
With the creation of the National Guard as an in-
termediary civilian-military force, Mexico is de-
bating the most profound reform of the security 
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and national defense apparatus since the 1917 Con-
stitution. The creation of this organization seeks to 
give the country an institution with a true national 
force. In order to contextualize the situation of se-
curity institutions, it is necessary to know specific 
data of their chronic fragmentation. Mexico has 
less than 30,000 pf officers, 36,000 Military Police 
members and close to 9,000 Navy police officers to 
serve its 130 million habitants.
The country is a federation, and as such, its 32 
states and 2,458 municipalities are jointly respon-
sible for public security. However, according to the 
National Diagnosis of state police officers, that was 
published by segob, in 2017 the local government 
barely has half of the minimum State police of 
force that it should have. According to this report, 
the state requires at least 115,943 new police offi-
cers to reach the minimum standard of 1.8 for ev-
ery one thousand habitants, totaling about 234,944 
police officers. Most governors in Mexico have 
been highly irresponsible for not creating public 
security institutions with enough human, profes-
sional, equipment and training capacities in order 
to meet the required numbers.
The deployment of the Armed Forces in pub-
lic security matters has generated an institutional 
trap. States have been affected by common crimes 
and by the violence provoked by the Mexican car-
tels, while governors rest in a comfort zone by 
continuing to use military and navy personnel in 
order to fulfill this security deficit.
President Andrés Manuel López Obrador re-
ceived a country with the highest levels of violence, 
corruption and impunity that have been registered 
probably since the Mexican Revolution at the be-
ginning of the 20th century. According to the Insti-
tute of National Statistics and Geography (inegi, 
by its Spanish acronym), in 2018 there were 36,685 
murders in Mexico. As seen in Figure 3, these have 
been critically on the rise since the start of the 
‘war on drug-trafficking’ in 2006. Given this, and 
because of the high incompetence of local govern-
ments, he wanted to accept full responsibility for the 
situation and proposed a militarized model of na-
tional police with legal arrest, investigation and de-
terrence capacities. Nevertheless, in the Senate, the 
opposition, scholars and civil organizations pushed 
the premise that the National Guard should have a 
civilian rule, albeit military doctrine and training.
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Figure 3. Total deaths by murder in Mexico 2006–2018
Source: inegi.
In all the discussions, there was the issue of 
the country’s militarization and the threat of the 
rise of the Armed Forces’ political power, which 
indeed have very few checks-and-balances and 
management mechanisms by civilian authorities. 
As expected, governors and mayors prefer to have, 
as a mediator in the deployment of the National 
Guard, a civilian minister whom they could nego-
tiate with and not an intransigent military officer 
when making their political petitions.
The first challenge that the National Guard is go-
ing to face is the recruitment of new cadets. Because 
of the infrastructure and national deployment of 
facilities, it would be much easier for the Army 
and Navy to train the new future members of the 
Guard with military discipline in matters of infor-
mation analysis, tactical operations, the handling 
of firearms and the use of vehicles. The pf, through 
its Police Development System, would help train 
future national wardens supported mainly by the 
Scientific, Intelligence and Gendarmerie divisions. 
Although the number of members has been on the 
rise, it remains an important element for the success 
of national security strategies. As portrayed on Ta-
ble 1, the National Defense Secretariat has deployed 
close to 52,000 members in 2018, a significant in-
crease with respect to 2005 with only 32,074.
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Table 1. Personnel of the National Defense Secretariat 
deployed in the fight against drug-trafficking and as 
back-up for public security, 2000–2018
2000 2005 2010 2016 2018
30,991 32,074 49,650 51,994 52,000
Source: Benítez (2019, p. 191).
The standardization of salaries and social bene-
fits is going to generate tensions, as well as the ori-
gin of the ruling in different areas of the Guard. The 
doctrines, codes, languages, thinking and the orga-
nizational culture are different between the military 
and the police. Changing the mentality of first-gen-
eration wardens that come from different institu-
tions is not going to be an easy task, but it is not an 
impossible one. The key component is going to be 
in the secondary laws that the Congress approves.
Everybody wins with the creation of a Nation-
al Guard with a civilian rule, as was approved in 
Congress. The Defense and Navy Secretariat would 
receive the additional budget approved in 2018 for 
the formation of this new institution. In political 
and strategic terms, the Security and Citizen Pro-
tection Secretariat, under Alfonso Durazo’s direc-
tion, is the winner. He is going to have a strategic 
role in the creation of this new organization. He 
will have to manage the structural power conflicts 
that are politically within the national security 
system. President López Obrador was recognized 
as a true leader by accepting the modifications that 
the political opposition, accompanied by activists 
and scholars, proposed.
There also remains the question of the powers 
that each institution has in internal security oper-
ations. As stated by Pion-Berlin (2017), the success 
of each operation (which in themselves are differ-
ent from one another) will depend on how well-de-
signed its institutional and operational framework 
is. If recruitment in the National Guard is de-
ployed to fulfill the tasks it was trained for, then it 
will be easier for it to avoid collateral damage. In 
this sense, the institutional design of the National 
Guard will be key to understand and have success 
in its activities as a public security institution.
Nevertheless, violence and impunity will not 
simply end with the creation of the Guard. These 
are problems structural in the security and justice 
systems, which are currently collapsed. Mexico has 
poor justice institutions in the local field, with very 
little independence from the local power. Very few 
state police bodies are truly professional. The gov-
ernment is barely paying attention to the issue of 
money laundering and asset recovery. If the current 
trend of creating and strengthening institutions 
continues, it is going to take at least a decade for 
Mexico to have security and justice institutions that 
allow impunity and violence level reductions.
Finally, there are two specific challenges for Lo-
pez Obrador’s administration. The first is that in 
the next couple of years the National Guard should 
move from being a military institution towards 
a civilian one. The second challenge is achieving 
the professionalization and strengthening of State 
security organizations which should reach mini-
mum structure and functioning standards that 
are actually verifiable. If this second challenge is 
not fulfilled, we are in danger of facing the debate 
of whether to employ the Armed Forces in public 
security matters in five years due to the incompe-
tence of local governments and civilian authorities.
The model of the National Guard has to be a 
‘modernized one’ as Sampó states (2019). Tradi-
tional Armed Forces are not ready to face modern 
threats and phenomena such as public security. 
Renewing its tasks can have a better impact in 
re-directing their activities in order to carry them 
out correctly. Through its deployment, this new se-
curity force has to be adapted to a civil police mod-
el, going through changes that do not necessarily 
represent a 180-degree turn of its capabilities. Even 
if the National Guard comes out as a hybrid force, 
there has to be reassurance that this new insti-
tution has a limited transitory model (Sampó & 
Troncoso, 2017 in Sampó, 2019) in order to carry 
out conventional and non-conventional tasks.
Using the Armed Forces in public security tasks 
(specifically in the fight against drug trafficking) is 
not something as new as it might seem, especially 
in countries such as Bolivia, Venezuela and Co-
lombia. Regarding Bolivia (one of the largest co-
caine producers globally), the Armed Forces work 
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on this issue since the 1980s and currently work 
to back-up the logistical operations of police forces 
in specialized groups. In Venezuela, the change in 
the use of the Armed Forces increased at the end of 
the Cold War and now develops as a full involve-
ment model, with the Armed Forces intervening in 
most of the social life in the country (Bartolomé, 
2019). Finally, in Colombia the involvement can be 
divided roughly in two phases: between 2007–2010 
and from 2012 to these days. The Armed Forces 
were within the framework of Plan Colombia and 
its main actions focused on combating guerrillas 
with an exponential increase of their budget (Ríos, 
2019). In the current scenario of the post Peace 
Deal, the situation is on a ‘limbo’ because of the 
uncertainty of their role in this process.
Conclusions
The participation of the Mexican Armed Forces in 
security matters is not a new trend, as some critics 
might say. On the contrary, their actions go back 
about 80 years, which has given rise to chronic path 
dependence. In the same way, the methodology 
used in this research allowed for a historical ap-
proach that contributed to identifying a trend —the 
militarization of public security in Mexico— as well 
as to the understanding of its perpetuation and of 
the institutional changes that favored this scenario.
In addition to this civilian dependence on mil-
itary action for public security issues, it is import-
ant to take into consideration that the Mexican 
Armed Forces have strongly benefited from the ex-
traordinary human, economic, technological and 
even international cooperation resources since 
2006. These incentives have generated dynamics 
between civilians and the military that nowadays 
perpetuate the inertia, and which has resulted in 
the creation of an organization such as the Nation-
al Guard.
The analysis of results over time also allows 
for identifying that rollback costs are remark-
ably high, particularly because the immediate re-
turn of the military to the barracks is impossible. 
There are no police institutions with the sufficient 
capacity for countering the violence crisis. This 
scenario generates uncertainty while suggesting 
an overwhelming rise of insecurity and violence 
levels. Likewise, it points to a conflict amidst the 
pursuit of justice in Mexico, because the attribu-
tions and duties have blurred. This has resulted in 
a dangerous perception that the civilian authori-
ties appear to be unnecessary.
The fight for power and resources in the public 
security sector will continue between civilian and 
military institutions. It is still too early to define 
who will be the real winners after the creation of 
the National Guard.
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